The distribution of social consumption in socialist countries by Zhang, Xiaoming, 1959-
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL CONSUMPTION
IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
by
XIAOMING ZHANG
B. Arch., Tsinghua University, Beijing
(1983)
M. Urban Plan., Tsinghua University, Beijing
(1986)
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements of the Degree of
Master of City Planning
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
May 1989
c Xiaoming Zhang 1989. All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
Certified by
Accepted by
DepWrtment of Urban Studies and Planning
May 18, 1989
eeIr ~
SA A
Lance Taylor
Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
I0 V **
Donald Schon
Director, MCP Committee
14 
I- S T TEC 
8.AUG 0 3 ??
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL CONSUMPTION
IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
by
XIAOMING ZHANG
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 18, 1989 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Master of
City Planning
ABSTRACT
In socialist countries, social consumption refers to the
free goods and services such as public housing, education,
health care, and transfer payments, which are distributed
through administrative allocation mechanisms.
Social consumption is a very important part of income
distribution in socialist countries. However, there are very
few studies on the distributional mechanisms of social
consumption and their results. Most scholars assume that
social consumption has a strong equalizing effect on the
overall distribution of income in socialist countries.
In this thesis, the author examines the distribution of
social consumption in detail by analyzing the distributional
mechanisms of public housing, education, health care, pension,
and price subsidies, in the following three countries: China,
Hungary, and the Soviet Union. The author compares the
distribution of social consumption with that of wages and
salaries, to see which is more unequally distributed.
All evidence in this study shows that social consumption
is not more equally distributed than wages; therefore, it does
not carry out the assumed function of equalizing the overall
income distribution.
Thesis Supervisor: Lance Taylor
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In socialist countries, social consumption refers to the
free goods and services such as public housing, education,
health care, and transfer payments, which are distributed
through administrative allocation mechanisms.
For many years, scholars both inside and outside socialist
countries have been engaged in numerous studies on the income
distribution under socialist system. Most of these scholars,
however, concentrate their studies on the distribution of
wages and salaries1 (see Wiles, 1974; Morrison, 1984, Bergson,
1984, Flakierski, 1986). They believe that because there is
no private ownership of means of production, and personal
income from capital gain and rent should be absent in
socialist countries, at least in the public sector, therefore,
wages are the main household income (Bergson, 1984;
Flakierski, 1986; Zhao, 1985). As Chilosi claims:
"inequalities in the structure of earnings are in principle
the basic source of inequalities of personal incomes" in
socialist countries (Chilosi, 1980, p. 3).
Based on such a common belief, those scholars tend to
1In the rest of the thesis, we will use "wages" to refer
to both wages and salaries.
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ignore the impact of social consumption on the overall
socialist distribution. Up till now, very few scholars have
paid attention to the mechanisms of social consumption
distribution and their results. Most of them assume that in
socialist countries social consumption are more equally
distributed than wages. Some people even claim that it has an
egalitarian tendency (McAuley, 1979; Chilosi, 1980; Bergson,
1984; Flakierski, 1985; Vinokur and Ofer, 1987).
In this thesis, the author challenge the above common
belief. The author argues that social consumption is a very
important part of socialist distribution, which deserves full
attention of research. In socialist countries, social
consumption is not more equally distributed than wages. As we
will see later, some items of social consumption are
distributed as unequally as the wage distribution, and some
other items are distributed more unequally than wages.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In the second
chapter, we will discuss some common features of
distributional mechanisms in most socialist countries. Then
we examine the composition of total consumption fund in
socialist countries to see the importance of social
consumption in the overall socialist distribution. In
chapters 3-7, We discuss one by one the distributions of major
items of social consumption: housing, education, health care,
pension, and price subsidies. Our emphasis will be on
comparing the distribution of social consumption with that of
8
wages in socialist countries, and to see which one is more
unequally distributed. In the final chapter, conclusions will
be presented.
9
Chapter 2
Composition of Socialist Distribution
In most socialist countries, national income is divided
into two parts: consumption and accumulation. Total
consumption usually consists of households' personal
consumption and social consumption. The personal consumption
includes wages and other work-related earnings (bonus and
work-related subsidies) from state-owned and collective work
units. The social consumption includes social, cultural and
welfare services (such as education, health care, free
housing, and cultural and entertaining facilities), government
administration expenditure, and national defense. Transfer
payments, such as pensions, social relief payments, and
stipends, are also included in the social consumption funds.
(Chu, 1978).
Total accumulation fund is divided into production-related
accumulation and consumption-related accumulation (Bor, 1974;
Chu, 1978). The latter is capital investment on
non-productive sector, such as capital investment in
hospitals, schools, and public housing. Because in socialist
countries, health care and education are free, and public
housing are distributed free of charge, consumption-related
accumulation is in fact an extra part of social consumption
10
Table 2.1 National Income Distribution in Socialist Countries
Accumulation Consumption
A. Capital construction A. Personal consumption
investment
including:
including: 1. wages and salaries
1. productive capital 2. bonus and work-related
investment subsidies
2. non-productive
investment B. Social consumption
a. housing construction
b. constructions on: including:
education, health, 3. education
and cultural 4. health care
facilities 5. house rent-subsidies
c. others 6. price subsidies of
consumer goods
B. Working capital 7. social relief funds
8. pensions
C. Inventory and loans 9. amenities
from banks 10. national defense
11. government
administration
12. science
13. propaganda (state-run
newspaper, radio & TV)
Note: Based on Chu, Cheng-Ping, 1978, "The National Economic
Balance Table," in Lardy, Nicholas R., White Plains, New
York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., pp. 122- 27.
* All the underlined items are household related consumption.
fund. Table 2.1 shows the main components of total income
distribution in socialist countries. In the table all the
underlined items are household related consumption. The study
of income distribution in socialist countries should cover all
of them. As we already noted, the distribution of wages in
socialist countries has been studied by many scholars, so that
in this thesis, we will concentrate on the distribution of
11
social consumption.
From Table 2.1, we can see that the social consumption
fund has two sources. One is from the consumption sector, and
the other is from accumulation sector. These social
consumption funds are controlled and distributed by central
planners in housing plan, education plan, health and cultural
plan (Lardy, 1978; Bor, 1967).
The ratio between the wages and social consumption
expenditures differs in different socialist countries. In
most countries, however, wages account for 50-60 percent of
total consumption fund, and social consumption is about 40-50
percent. Table 2.2 shows the composition of total household
consumption fund in the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics) in 1970. The ratio between wages and social
consumption was 58:42. Table 2.3 shows the ratio in China in
1983 was 53:47 for urban population.
Compared to the social welfare expenditure in the Western
industrial countries, the social consumption in socialist
countries is very different in nature. First, while the
social welfare programs in the West, such as unemployment-
insurance, low-income public housing projects, medicaid, and
food stamps, are exclusively provided for the poor people
(SAUS, 1989), the social consumption in socialist countries is
distributed to the entire population. Second, the social
consumption plays a far more important role in the total
household consumption in socialist countries than the social
12
Table 2.2 Composition of Consumption Fund
Rubles (billions) Percent
Income Categoties Total State Total State
Sector Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Earnings from Labor 138.0 123.0 58.5 58.1
B. Social consumption fund 97.9 88.8 41.5 41.9
1. Transfer payments 32.7 29.5 13.9 13.9
a. Holiday pay 9.1 8.2 3.9 3.9
b. Pensions 16.2 14.6 6.9 6.9
c. Allowances 6.1 5.5 2.6 2.6
d. Stipends 1.3 1.2 0.6 0.6
2. Consumption in kind 65.2 59.3 27.6 28.0
e. Subsidies 18.8 18.8 8.0 8.9
i. Housing-rent 3.5 3.5 1.5 1.7
ii. Food 14.8 14.8 6.3 7.0
iii. Others 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2
f. Free goods and
Services 46.4 40.5 19.7 19.1
iv. Education 18.7 16.8 7.9 7.9
v. Housing 16.3 13.4 6.9 6.3
vi. Health 11.4 10.3 4.8 4.9
Total 235.9 211.8 100.0 100.0
Sources: Column 1: line ii:
line vi: Dobson, 1988;
Treml 1978; line V: Dimaio, 1974;
all the others: McAuley, 1979.
Column 2: line A, McAuley, 1979; Line v: Dimaio,
1974; other figures are derived by assuming that state
employees received the following share of the total: line
a, b, c, d, iv, vi: 90 percent; line i. ii. iii: 100
percent. In 1970, Soviet state employees account for 84.8
percent of total labor force. Study in our later
chapters indicates that they obtain social consumption
more than national average.
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in the USSR, 1970
Table 2.3 Composition of Consumption Fund in Urban Sector,
China 1983
Income Categories Yuan (billions)*l Percent
A. Wages (including sick leave) 93.5 53.2
among which:
Bonuses, piece-rate wages
and above-quota payments 12.1 6.9
B. Social consumption fund 82.4 46.8
1.Labor insurance & welfare 21.0 11.9
a. Retire-pension 8.7 4.9
b. Welfare expenditure*2 1.7 1.0
c. House-rent subsidies 4.6 2.6
d. Health 6.0 3.4
2.Relief funds for
natural disasters 0.4 0.2
3.Consumption in kind 61.0 34.7
e. Price subsidies 32.8 18.6
f. Housing investment 17.8 10.1
g. Education expenditure
from state budget 10.6 6.0
h. Education expenditure
from state-owned firms 2.9 1.6
i. Capital investment in
Education & Health 3.9 2.2j. Deduction of wages from
education & health -7.0 -4.0
Total 175.9 100.0
Sources: SSBP, 1984, p III-6, 14, 15, 36, IV-58; SSBP, 1987,
p. 556, 557, 559; except: line a: Zhuan & Li, 1985, p.
27; line c: based on SSBP, 1984, p. 111-81, and Zhu & Wang
1988 p. 59; line 5: residue.
*1: All the data in this column are originally stated for
urban sector. Except lines g, i, j. For line j, and i:
in 1983 total state expenditure on education was 15.1
billion yuan, capital investment on education and health
was 4.9 billion yuan. We assume that urban sector
receives 70% share of total educational fund and 80% of
investment in E & H. For line j: in 1983 total wages in
the sector of "science, education, health, and cultural
activities" was 11.0 billion yuan, we assume that 80% of
the total went to E & H of which 80% in urban sector.
*2: Including allowances, social relief and others.
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welfare programs in Western countries. In the United States,
for example, the ratio between total personal disposable
income and the public social welfare expenditure was 79.6
20.4 (SAUS, 1989, p. 334, p. 414). In China and the USSR, as
we see from Tables 2.2 and 2.3, this ratio is almost half to
half.
From the above comparison, we learn that the distribution
of social consumption is a very important part of total
socialist distribution, therefore it has a great impact on the
total inequalities in socialist countries.
There are only a few studies available on the
distribution of social consumption, which are conducted by
Western scholars. These studies tend to show that social
consumption is very equally distributed in socialist
countries. Adam and Nosal (1982, P. 195), for example,
conclude that the distribution of transfer payments among
household-income groups within each social stratum continues
to favor low-income groups, which "contributed to a narrowing
of household income differentials for the whole country."
To date, the most comprehensive study on distribution of
social consumption in socialist countries is conducted by Ofer
and Vinokur (1988). They did a sample survey of Soviet
immigrants who went to Israel during the mid1970s. Ofer and
Vinokur found that the distribution of the social consumption
fund was very equal in the Soviet Union. Data presented in
Table 2.4 show that although the households in the highest
15
decile receive wages 6.6 times as much as that received by
those in the lowest decile group, the former only receive 1.6
times as much as social consumption fund that received by the
latter. Among all items of social consumption, retirement
pensions and educational fund are distributed particularly in
favor of low-income groups. Households in lowest income
decile received twice as much retirement pensions and
educational fund as that received by households in the highest
decile group. Health services and housing subsidies are also
distributed much more equally than wage distribution; only
food subsidies are distributed in favor of higher income
families, but it is still more equal than wage distribution.
In general, according to Ofer and Vinokur, the social
consumption fund has a great redistributive impact on overall
distribution, which reduces the ratio between the top and
bottom deciles from 6.6 in wage distribution to 3.6 in overall
distribution.
Moreover, the Hungarian official statistical data also
demonstrate an extremely equal distribution of social
consumption among all the household income deciles. Table 2.5
shows the distribution of social benefits in Hungary in 1972
and 1977. According to the table, the social consumption is
distributed very flatly among the entire population.
On the other hand, many scholars in socialist countries
as well as from the West, such as Szelenyi (1983), Daniel
(1983), Lane (1982), and McAuley (1979), have examined
16
Table 2.4 DISTRIBUTION1 OF INCOHE AND SOCIAL COISUMPTIOH PER HOUSEHOLD MEMBER,
FOR ACTIVE POPULATION, USSR 1973
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deciles of Household Members (rubles)x2 Ratio between
----------------------------------------------------- Top and Bottom
1 2 4 6 9 10 Deciles
1. Total public income 72.6 79.5 109.6 120.8 172.0 258.3 3.56
2. Public earnings 31.2 48.4 68.1 87 134.1 206.3 6.61
3. Social consumption fund 41.4 31.3 41.5 33.8 37.9 52.0 1.26
a. Money payments 18.2 12.4 17.3 11.5 8.9 13.1 0.72
i. Retirement pensions 11.4 1.3 0.3 5.9 2.4 5.4 0.47
b. NoniTionetary services 23.2 18.6 24.2 22.3 29.0 39.0 1.68
ii. Educationx3 4.5 4.6 5.2 5.5 2.5 2.2 0.49
iii. Health care 2.9 3.4 3.3 3.1 4.1 3.7 1.28
iv. Housing subsidies 5.5 3.0 3.3 3.4 7.2 9.0 1.64 H
v. Food subsidies 10.3 7,6 12.4 10.3 15.2 24.1 2.34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
M1: Active population is defined as all households with heads uorking in the pubic sector.
x2: Deciles are based on monthly earnings per household member.
M3: Part is subsidies and part is free services; stipends are excluded.
Source: Gur Ofer and Aaron Vinokur, 1988. "The distributive effects of the Soviet consumption fund
in the Soviet Union," in G. Lapidus and Guy E. Swanson, ed. State arid Nelfare USR/USSR,
Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, p. 226.
Table 2.5 Distribution of Social Benefits In Kind In
Selected Years, Hungary
Year Decile of Households (in percent)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1972 9.0 9.8 10.2 10.3 10.6 10.1 10.2 10.1 9.7 10.0
1977 9.0 9.7 10.0 10.6 10.4 10.8 10.2 10.0 9.8 9.6
Source: Flakierski, Henryk, 1986, Economic Reform and Income
distribution: A Case Study of Hungary and Poland, Armonk,
New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. p. 105.
inequalities in one or several items of social consumption,
such as public housing, free education, pensions, and free
health care. Most of these studies show that there are
serious inequalities in the distribution of social
consumption. Furthermore, contrary to Hungarian statistical
data, official statistical data from China (as shown in Table
2.6), indicate that at least the monetary part of social
consumption, i.e., transfer payments, is distributed more
unequally than wages. In 1986, the ratio between wages
received by the top 10 percent per capita income households
and that by the bottom 10 percent is 2.7:1, while the ratio
between the retirement pensions received by the two groups is
3.4:1, which is greater than the wage ratio.
Why is there such a controversy? Why do Hungarian and
Chinese data differ so much? Do the Hungarian and Soviet data
represent the truth, or do the Chinese data? Is it because
the distributions of social consumption are very equal in
18
Table 2.6 Distribution of Urban Wages, Pensions, and
Subsidies by Households Per Capita Income Deciles,
in Both Public and Collective Sectors, China, 1986
Income Household Deciles (yuan) Ratio of
Category Top/Bottom
1 2 9 10 Deciles
Wages 355.4 469.0 835.1 970.9 2.7
Retirement
pensions 36.4 31.8 79.9 121.9 3.4
Subsidies 46.6 60.6 119.3 134.4 2.9
* Including both state-owned and collective sectors.
Source: SSBP, 1986: State Statistical Bureau PRC. A Survey of
Income and Expenditure of Urban Households in China, 1985,
Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy
Service Center, p. 25.
Hungary and the Soviet Union, and more unequal in China?
In the following chapters, we will search for the answers
to the above questions by examining in detail the
distributional mechanisms and results in the allocation of
major items of social consumption: public housing, education,
health care, pensions, and price subsidies. Each chapter
deals with one of the items. We will mainly concentrate on
data from the USSR, China, and Hungary, for the reason that
data from these countries are much easier to obtain than from
other socialist countries.
19
Chapter 3
Public Housing
Housing is a large item of consumption in kind in
socialist countries. In the Soviet Union in 1970, the urban
public housing expenditure, which including housing investment
and rent-subsidies, was 13.8 percent of total earnings in
urban public sector. 2 In China in 1983, it was 23.8 percent
(SSBP, 1984).
In most socialist countries, housing is a public good to
be built and allocated through the administrative allocation
system. Each year, the state puts a portion of the national
investment fund into housing construction, and distributes it
to people through administrative allocation mechanisms
(DiMaio, 1974; Daniel, 1983; Zhu and Wang, 1988).
Because in socialist countries, wages and salaries are set
to exclude the cost of housing (Szelenyi, 1983), housing has
to be distributed to people virtually free. Housing rent is
very low in all the socialist countries. In China, for
example, it was only 2.6 percent of average household income
in 1961. It decreased to 1.4 percent in 1981, and further
decreased to 0.9 percent in 1986 (SSBP, 1987). In Eastern
Europe and the USSR, rents for public housing are only 1-3
2 This figure is computed based on data from McAuley (1979),
and DiMaio (1974).
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percent of average family income (Suranyi-Unger, 1972). Such
low rents cannot even cover the housing maintenance cost. The
state not only has to provide free housing, but also has to
pay the most part of the housing maintenance cost.
Such a low wage, free housing policy is the main cause
for the chronic housing shortage in socialist countries.
There is an insatiable demand for housing, because everybody
is entitled to get housing from the state, and the more
housing one gets, the more benefits she or he obtains. On the
supply side, the state does not have incentives to build more
housing, because housing investment is actually regarded a
heavy burden--it cannot generate direct revenue for the state
(Zhu and Wang, 1988). Even when under social pressures, the
state does want to increase housing supply, there is a limited
amount of capital available. It is acknowledged by the
governments of the socialist countries that under the
administrative allocation of housing, the conflicts between
the limited supply of housing and the insatiable demand for it
can never be solved (Conner, 1979; Daniel, 1983; Liu, 1989).
One solution now being adopted by many socialist countries
is to allow private ownership of housing property and to
encourage private housing investment. In the USSR, this
policy was adopted as early as in 1947 (Dimaio, 1974). In
China, it was started only in the mid1980s. This policy, as
we will see later, has a strong negative impact on income
distribution, because under such a policy, public housing is
21
only distributed to a part of urban population. Thus, those
who get public housing receive a large share of the
concentrated public housing fund, and others who do not get
housing receive nothing, they have to build housing on their
own resources.
Take China as an example. According to the official 1985
statistical data, the average cost for building a 55 square
meter flat of apartment type housing was 30,000 yuan, and the
basic maintenance and repair cost for the flat was 240 yuan a
year (see Zhu and Wang, 1988). Residents had only to pay 55.8
yuan for housing rent, and the state subsided the remaining
184.2 yuan of maintenance cost. Now let us consider two
households with the average annual income--748.9 yuan per
capita in 1985 (SSBP, 1986). One family receives a 55 square
meter flat from the state, so it receives not only the 30,000
yuan investment free3, but also the 184.2 yuan of maintenance
cost. The other family, on the other hand, is unable to get
public housing, and it has to build a house of the same size
and same cost on their own. Thus, while the first family can
enjoy free housing and rent-subsidies forever, the second
family not only has to invest 30,000 yuan from their own
pocket, but also has to spend 240 yuan (184.2 plus 55.8) to
maintain it. From this example we can see the distributive
3once the family obtain the flat, they usually can live
there for decades, and leave to their children, unless they move
to better public housing. Therefore, in fact they own the flat.
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impact of public housing. For an average income family with
748.9 yuan per capita annual income, the 30,000 yuan
investment and several hundred yuan annual cost would be an
extremely heavy burden.
Now, the question is who gets the most from public
housing? Does most public housing stock in socialist
countries go to the poorest groups in society, as is the case
of the public housing projects in Western industrial
countries? Or instead, do those who have power, status, and
high income have the priority in obtaining public housing? To
find the answers, let us examine how the public housing is
distributed in China, Hungary, and the Soviet Union.
China
In China, everybody working in the public sector relies on
the government to provide housing. Public housing is built
and distributed by work units, which receive housing
investment funds and subsidies from the government, and build
and distribute housing to workers and staff within the work
units (Liu, 1989).
There are two levels of inequalities in housing
distribution. First, there is an inequality among different
work units. According to Zhu and Wang (1988, p. 27), large
industry enterprises, government agents, and all those work
23
units with political or economic power usually get more
housing funds from the state than others, so that, on average,
people working in these units have better housing conditions.
Other work units, such as most work units at local level or
remote areas, small enterprises, collective-enterprises,
middle and primary schools, etc., usually get few or no
housing funds. People working in these "peripheral" units
suffer the most from the housing shortage.
The second level of inequality is within work units, where
housing is officially distributed according to a criteria
which is based on a person's seniority, performance, need, and
administrative ranks4 . In the circumstances of housing
shortages, however, the administrative rank is usually the
only criteria observed (Zhu and Wang, 1988, p. 23).
Table 3.1 shows the official regulation on housing
standards for different administrative ranks, which allows
people in higher positions to have better housing. We note
that the regulation only sets standards up to middle-level
cadres. For those at higher levels, such as managers of large
enterprises, high-level military officers, and cadres at
provincial, municipal, and ministerial levels and higher,
there is no restrictive regulations of housing standards.
4In China, all the occupations are attached to an
administrative rank. We have "monk with branch-director's
rank," or "monk with county-director's rank"; "restaurant-
director with county-governor's rank" or "with department-
director's rank"; and "professor with province-governor's rank."
Each rank corresponds to a specific level of privileges. (Chen,
1988)
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Table 3.1 Urban Housing Standards, China, 1983
Social Group Type of Housing Area
Apartment Per Flat (Sq.M.)
1. Ordinary Workers and A 42-45
Staff B 45-50
2. Country-Level Cadres, C 60-70
Branch-Level Cadres, and
Middle-Level Intellectuals
3. Prefecture-Level Cadres, D 80-90
Department-Level Cadres, and
High-Level Intellectuals
Source: The State Council, 1984, "The State Regulation on
Control of Urban Housing Standards," Almanac of
China's Economy, Beijing: China Statistical
Information and Consultancy Service Center.
In fact, the above regulation has never been well-
observed. As one state government document points out, many
provinces and ministries ignore the state regulation and set
their own higher housing standards freely, and they build
increasingly larger and higher-standard housing for leading
cadres (SSBR, 1984). Study by Zhu and Wang (1988) also shows
that many not-so-privileged cadres and those who have
connections with powerful cadres usually obtain more housing
by occupying two or three flats, each within the standards of
the state housing regulation. For cadres, housing is a symbol
of power and social position, so they often compete with each
other to show off who has the better and larger housing (Zhu
and Wang, 1988).
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On the other hand, the majority of population are not able
to obtain housing even at the lowest standard of the state
regulation. Because the total public housing investment is
fixed for each year, when those who have power try their best
to obtain more housing, ordinary people will inevitably have
less housing. According to the data from China's first urban
housing census in 1986 (see Zhu and Wang, 1988; Liu, 1989),
1.28 million urban households had no housing at all, i.e.,
they lived in warehouses, corridors, workshops, classrooms,
office rooms, and basement year after year; another 4.15
million households were "inconvenient households," i.e., three
generations living in one bedroom, parents and grown-up
children living in one bedroom, or two couples living in one
bedroom. These two types of households accounted for 13.7
percent of China's total urban households.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the housing distributions among
Table 3.2. Average Per Capita Housing Distribution by Social
Groups, Beijing 1986.
Social Groups Average Housing Building Area
(Sq.M./Person)
1. Ordinary Workers 3
2. Employees at municipal level 6
3. Employees at the Central government level 9
Source: Zhu, Jienghong, and Wang, Guozen, 1988, Housing-
Housing, (in Chinese) Shengyang: Liaoning People's
Publishing House, p. 28.
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Table 3.3 Average Per Capita Housing Distribution by Social
Groups, Shanghai 1982.
Social Groups Average
1. Cadres at and above Branch Level
2. Average-staff
3. Primary- and middle-school teachers
4. Manual Workers
Housing Building Area
Housing Building Area
(Sq. M./Person)
8.17
6.22
5.58
4.49
Source: Zhu, Jienghong, and Wang, Guozen, 1988, Housing-
Housing, (in Chinese) Shengyang: Liaoning People's
Publishing House, p. 25.
social groups in Beijing and Shanghai. According to the data
in the two tables, people with higher ranks in the
hierarchical structure have more housing.
In terms of the overall distribution of housing, in 1986,
25.7 percent of China's urban population had a per capita
housing building area below 4 square meters, 21 percent above
8 square meters (SSBP, 1987). In order to compare with the
wage distribution in China, we assume that the average housing
area received by the bottom 20 percent of population was 3
square meters per capita in 1985, and that received by the top
20 percent was 10 square meters per capita. Then the ratio
between the housing received by top 20 percent households and
the bottom 20 percent households was 3.3:1, which is much
higher than the ratio of wages received by the top 20 percent
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and the bottom 20 percent, which is 1.8:1 (see SSBP, 1988).
If we further consider the differences in housing quality and
facilities, the disparity will be much larger.
To sum up, from the above analysis, we may conclude that
the public housing is more unequally distributed among the
population than the wages. Public housing does not equalize
the overall income distribution, instead, it further increases
inequalities in the Chinese society.
Hungary
Housing policy in Hungary is the same as in China in that
the state only provides housing for urban population.
Although in the urban areas, the proportion of privately owned
dwellings has been increasing, the prevailing form of
dwellings is still state-owned apartment houses. In 1980, the
ratio of state-owned dwellings in Budapest was close to 60
percent (Daniel, 1985, p. 392).
In Hungary, due to the dualistic housing system, i.e., the
co-existence of public free housing and private housing
market, inequality in public housing distribution has become
"one of the most important differentiating factors of the
society" (Daniel, 1985, p. 393).
In the late 1960s, Szelenyi and Konrad made a housing
survey in two Hungarian cities. Their data show that the
state distribution of housing in Hungary systematically
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favored the higher income groups, both in quality of housing
and rent subsidies. The overwhelming majority of the working
class has to house itself by building or buying at market
prices. Consequently, "the richer classes get better housing
for less money and effort, while poorer classes get worse
housing at the cost of more money or effort, or both"
(Szelenyi, 1983, p. 63).
As Szelenyi further points out, this inequality of
housing distribution is caused by the socialist distribution
policy. Because wages are set to reward those with higher
status and position in the social stratification, and wages do
not cover the cost of housing and other public goods and
services, then the distribution of housing and other public
goods can only be determined by people's position and status.
Reward, instead of need, is the basic criteria for housing
distribution.
More recent studies further reveal the inequalities in
public housing distribution in Hungary. According to the 1976
household statistics, low-income households not only lived in
low quality housing, but also received much less in rent
subsidies than average households. The rent subsidies
received by households in the two lowest income brackets5 were
12% of their low annual income, while the households in the
two highest income brackets, covering 8 percent of total
5The population was classified into ten income brackets,
according to their household per capita income.
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households, received rent subsidies that amount to 13-15
percent of their high annual income, in addition to their high
housing qualities, better facilities and more spacious
dwellings. In terms of the absolute amount of the subsidy,
households in the second highest income bracket received 7.6
times as much as that received by the households in the lowest
bracket (Daniel, 1983, p. 95).
Table 3.4 compares the disparity in the distribution of
earnings to that in housing distribution in Hungary. The
first line in the table shows the earning difference between
"workers" and "intellectuals and managerial," the ratio
between the latter and the former is 1.29:1. The data in the
third line indicate that the ratio of housing received by the
two groups is 1.64:1, and the data in the next line show that
the ratio of rent subsidies received by the two groups is
1.84:1. Apparently the public housing and rent subsidies are
more unequally distributed than wages6
6Some people may argue that the disparities on both wage
distribution and housing distribution are not very significant
between the two groups. However, we are only comparing two
aggregate groups. In fact, the "intellectual and managerial"
group includes both low-income rank-and-file workers and high-
income bureaucrats and managers. if we break it down, both the
earning disparity and the housing disparity would be much
greater. For example, in 1977, the ratio between the average
earnings of the top 10% and the bottom 10% household per capita
income groups was 4.1 : 1 (Flakierski, 1986, p. 91). Our
purpose here is not to show how unequal the distributions are,
but to compare the inequalities in housing distribution to that
of wages distribution, and to see which one is more unequally
distributed.
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Table 3.4 Redistributive
To Social Groul
Effects of Rent-subsidies According
ps, Hungary, 1980.
Workers Intellectuals C/B
Managerial
(B) (C) (D)
3079223819
0.52
Subject
(A)
1.Average Annual
Earning (Ft/Person)
2.Average Number of
Rooms Per Person
3.Average Quality
Number of Rooms
Per Person7
4.Annual Average
Subsidy (Ft/Person)
5.Subsidy in Percentage
of Income
Ft: Frionts.
Source: Daniel, Z., 1983,
Central Redistribution
31 (1-2), p. 97.
0.74
1.99
5150
16.70
1.29
1.42
1.64
1.84
1.41
"Public Housing, Personal Income and
in Hungary," Acta Oeconomica, Vol.
Apparently, the advantaged social group is further better
off through the housing subsidies. Then, what is the overall
distributional effect? According to the 1976 survey, the
ratio of per head household earnings between the highest and
the lowest deciles was 4.5:1, with the public housing supply
indicator (see the footnote to Table 4.6) taken into account,
this ratio rises to 12.5:1 (Ibid). In a separate study,
7 This indicator combines both quantity and quality of
dwelling. It expresses quality as an "additional number of
rooms," Thus the room of a dwelling with a bathroom is valued
twice as high as a flat without bathroom, and modern heating is
worth a further half-room (Daniel, 1983).
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1.21
2802
11.80
Flakierski (1986) also noted the serious inequality in public
housing distribution. As Daniel (1985, p. 408) concludes:
"The allocation of apartments or flats does not reduce but, on
the contrary, increases inequality within our society."
USSR
The public housing policies in the USSR are very similar
to those in China. The state takes full responsibility of
providing housing for people. During 1981-1985, state capital
investment accounted for more than 70 percent of total housing
investment (Sherer, 1987, p. 299). As in all other socialist
countries, there is a constant shortage of housing supply.
According to Sherer (1987), the Moscow News reported that in
1986 there were 90 million people waiting for housing, which
would need 27 million apartments, so people on the waiting
list have to wait more than ten years on average for obtaining
public housing.
In the Soviet Union, public housing serves as a valuable
tool of rewards. The Soviet housing law explicitly states that
the authority should give housing priority to people with
outstanding performance, or high skills and any person
specifically designated by the government (Dimaio, 1974).
Thus, the policy not only justifies unequal distribution, but
also give a high degree of flexibility to those in charge of
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housing distribution to use housing for patronage purposes.
In 1985, for example, the Frunze city executive committee
distributed 1862 new public apartments, only 216 of these
apartments (11.6%) were available to people on the waiting
list, 88.4 percent were distributed through other channels
(Sherer, 1987, p. 299). Matthews (1978) also noted the
privileges received by the Soviet elites in housing
distribution in the USSR.
To sum up, first, it is very clear that public housing
distribution in socialist countries serves as an integral part
of socialist distribution. It does not serve the same
function as public housing projects in Western countries,
which is to help the poor. On the contrary, in socialist
countries, it is the people who have political power and
position that tend to have priority in obtaining public
housing, and the poor people tend to live in private housing.
Second, in most socialist countries, not only is public
housing very unequally distributed, but also this unequal
distribution of housing increases the overall economic
inequality.
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Chapter 4
Education
Education is the second largest in-kind distribution in
socialist countries. In the USSR, the educational fund
amounted to 13.6 percent of total wage bill in 1970 (see Table
2.2). In China, it amounted to 16.5 percent of total wage bill
in 1983 (see Table 2.3).
Education is free in all socialist countries. Common
wisdom is that free education tends to have a strong
equalizing impact, because it helps the children from low-
income families to obtain education. In this chapter, we will
test this common belief by examining the education systems in
the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries. The
main question we ask here is whether the educational fund is
more equally distributed than wages, or vice versa.
The Soviet Union
Although education in the Soviet Union is tuition-free,
many low-income families still find it an economic burden to
let their children to go to school. According to a 1973
general survey of education conducted in six regions of the
Soviet Union, half of the first-graders and two-fifths of the
eighth-graders reported family per capita monthly incomes of
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50 rubles and less, which is less than the amount needed to
maintain the minimal standard of living estimated by Soviet
8
economists. Many Soviet families need their children to earn
money as early as possible. Contrasted with the tangible
rewards afforded by employment, it is too costly for many
families to allow their children for two or three more years
of high-school study or five more years of college. Besides
this opportunity cost, there is also a direct cost. Although
in recent years, seven out of ten college students received
state stipends, and more than half lived in state-subsidized
dormitories, most families still have to contribute to their
children's support. If a student received a stipend and lived
either in a dormitory or at home, his or her family still has
to provide some 15-25 rubles a month to make ends meet
(Dobson, 1988). The burden was considerable for poor families
with per capita monthly income below 50 rubles. If the
student did not get a scholarship or had to rent an apartment,
the cost become excessive for many.
On the other hand, families in the upper strata can afford
these economic costs. To them, not having their children to
go to college is a risk too high to take, because in the USSR,
as well as in all other socialist countries, to be educated is
8 See Dobson (1988, p. 42). According to him, in the Soviet
six-region survey, the first-graders' teachers collected
information on income from the parents, while the eighth-graders
were asked to report their families' income themselves. The data
are subject to the biases of under-reporting.
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the necessary condition for climbing up the social hierarchy,
though it may not be a sufficient condition (Lane, 1982).
Consequently, free education in the Soviet Union is not
equally distributed among all social groups. The data in
Table 4.1 are from the 1973 six-region survey, with which we
find two phenomena. First, the data show different chances of
Table 4.1 USSR Social-occupational Characteristics of
Eighth-graders', Tenth-graders', and College
Students' Parents. Six-region Survey, 1973
Parents' Percent of Students
Occupational Status Eighth- Tenth- Index of Disparity
Father Mother Grade Grade College Changea Indexb
Specialist Specialist 13.1% 19.1% 36.3% 278 647
Specialist Employee 5.4 6.4 9.6 178 414
Employee Employee 2.7 3.5 3.4 126 293
Worker Specialist 7.7 6.3 8.3 108 251
Worker Employee 12.0 14.7 9.8 82 190
Worker Worker 24.6 20.1 12.0 49 114
Farm- Farm-
worker worker 20.6 16.1 8.8 43 100
All others 13.9 13.8 11.8 -- --
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Dobson, Richard B., 1988, "High Education in the
Soviet Union: Problems of Access, Equality, and Public
Policy," in G. W. Lapidus & G. E. Swanson, State and
Welfare USA/USSR, p. 27.
a. Index of Change: the proportion of each student group in
college compared to its proportion among eighth-graders
(eighth-grade = 100).
b. Disparity Index: the degree to which the chances for
becoming college students for eighth-graders from various
strata when the children of farm workers is taken as the
reference point (= 100).
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becoming college students for children of different social
origins. The "disparity index" reveals that the offspring of
both-specialists parents were 5.7 times as likely to enter
college as urban manual workers' children at the eighth-grade.
Moreover, since the specialists include occupations as diverse
as scientists with postgraduate degrees and elementary-school
teachers, chief-engineers and rank-and-file technicians, high-
level party officials and minor administrators, a more finely
differentiated breakdown would magnify the differences.
Nonetheless, the data clearly reveal the overall unequal
distribution of free education. Second, the table also shows
that there were many high school drop-outs in the lower social
strata. At the high school level, for example, the proportion
of children from farm-families to the total student body
dropped from 20.6 percent at eighth grade to 16.1 percent at
tenth grade, and children from workers' families dropped from
24.6 percent to 20.1 percent.
Table 4.2 shows that in the late-1960s the distribution
of college education was very unequal among different social
groups. The data show that although "specialists" only
accounted for 14.2 percent of the employed population, their
children consist of one-third to one-half of the student body
of different universities. The children from the working
class, which made up some 75 percent of the employed
population, only accounted for about 30 percent of the student
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Table 4.2 Occupational Status of Soviet Students in Different
Universities, Late 1960s
Occupational % of Employed % of Student
Status of Parents Population Body Index
Specialists 14.2 31.5-51.0 2.17-3.59
Nonspecialist
employees 10.6 9.1-29.5 0.86-2.78
Workers 60.0 25.3-29.4 0.42-0.49
Collective farmers 15.2 0.9- 4.2 0.06-0.28
Source: Yanowich, Murray, 1977, Social and Economic Inequality
in the Soviet Union, White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
pp. 88-89.
9
body of these universities.
In the beginning of this chapter, we mentioned Ofer and
Vinokur's study of the distribution of Soviet social
consumption in Table 2.4. Ofer and Vinokur claim that the
distribution of education favors low-income groups rather than
high-income groups. The ratio between the top and bottom
decile groups in terms of receiving education benefits is
0.49:1, which means that people in the lowest income decile
receive twice as many the educational benefits as those in the
9Some people may argue that it is not necessary for the
working people to have college education. However, here what
we are interested is the distributive effect of the free
education policy, i.e., who gets the most benefits from this
free education policy, and whether this policy increases the
overall inequalities in society. The free education is actually
financed by everybody in the nation. If, as those argued, it is
not necessary for working people to go to college, then it is
also not necessary and not fair for them to bear the economic
burden of the free education.
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top income decile. However, from the above analysis the
Soviet educational system and the social structure, we would
conclude that Ofer and Vinokur's data are very unlikely to be
correct.
China
In China, due to the shortages of state education funding,
only a small proportion of primary school graduates can go to
junior high school, of which a small proportion go to senior
high school, and an even smaller proportion to college. The
figures below show the total numbers of students at different
levels of education in 1985. From the data, we can see
clearly the serious shortages of educational opportunities in
higher levels of education in China (SSBP, 1986).
Primary School students: 133.70 million;
Junior high school students: 40.11 million;
Senior high school students: 11.56 million;
Undergraduate students: 1.70 million;
Graduate students: 0.09 million.
Another character of China's educational system is that
the free education is basically concentrated in urban areas.
In the rural areas, the state only provides limited financial
support for primary and junior high schools, which basically
rely on farmers' collective funding (Ji, 1985). Children of
farmers can go to urban areas to attend senior high school,
through competitive entrance-examinations. However, many
farmers' children cannot afford to live and study in urban
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high schools, so even if they are able to compete with urban
students, the chances of going to senior high school are much
smaller for rural population than for urban population.
Needless to say, the chances of going to universities are even
much lower for farmers' children. In 1984, only 26.5 percent
of undergraduate students in China were from rural areas,
although about 80 percent of total population were farmers
(SSBP, 1986). Thus, we estimate that more than 70 percent of
state expenditures on education is concentrated in urban
sector.
The education system in China's urban areas has developed
a very complex, elite-promoting hierarchical structure. Even
in the urban areas, the chances of any student in primary
school to go through all the levels to university are very
slim and the competition for education opportunities is very
strong. Consequently, the main criteria for judging the
quality of a school is based on the proportion of its
graduates entering schools of a higher level. The whole
Chinese education system is geared to reward those schools
that have higher rates of graduates entering higher levels of
school (Zhang, 1982). Take secondary education for example,
in China both junior high and senior high schools are
classified into two different qualities: key schools and
ordinary schools. The key schools usually get more funding,
better facilities, and higher quality teachers, and the
ordinary schools are usually down played by the government,
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with much less material supports. When students graduate from
primary schools, they face two different futures. Those in
the upper level can go to key junior high schools, which means
they will get higher quality education and much better chances
to go to senior high schools; and those in the middle and
lower levels go to ordinary schools, a few in the bottom may
not even be admitted. Then, after they graduate from junior
high school, this selection procedure happens once more.
Furthermore, within each senior high school, key or
ordinary, students are classified into "advanced class" and
"slow class" according to their grades in the examinations.
The former are those considered more likely to make their way
to college, and the latter are those considered to have few
chances to go to college (Zhang, 1982).
This hierarchical elite-selecting structure tends to
discriminate against children of lower income and lower
educated families. One study found that there is a high
correlation between parents' educational levels and students'
performances in primary and middle school, and most repeaters
were found from manual workers families (Wu, 1984).
According to the author's knowledge, in China, going to
school is also considered by many low-income families as an
economic burden. Student drop-outs in elementary and middle
schools is a well known phenomenon. A study on student drop-
outs in junior high schools in the city of Tianjin shows that
in 1986 the drop-out rate in junior-high school was 2.8
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percent for first-graders, 8.2 percent for second-graders, and
6.0 percent for the third-graders. Most of the drop-outs were
from low income workers' families, mainly because their
parents want them to work to help support families (Tianjin
Ribao, April 18, 1986).
On the other hand, children from intellectuals' families
and from bureaucratic officials' families are much favored by
this system. The former usually have a strong family
tradition of higher education, and their children tend to do
very well in school; and the latter have privileges of access
to school. Elites' children can go to the best high schools
that are especially set up for them (Parish, 1981). In a
speech in 1982, the Chinese minister of education reported
that many cadres used their power to make their not-so-good
children get into key schools and "advanced class" (Zhang,
1982).
Given such an elite-selecting structure of secondary
school, naturally the college education in China is very
unequally distributed among different social groups. There is
strong evidence that children from low social strata are much
less represented in college level education. Take a rural
county for example, in 1978, 231 college applicants in the
county were admitted to colleges and universities. Among
them only 48 were from workers' families, and 73 from farmers'
families. Together they represent 52.4 percent of the total
applicants being admitted, although over 99 percent of the 1
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Table 4.3 Occupational Status of Chinese Students in
Colleges and Graduate Schools, 1977-87
Occupational % of Employed % of Undergra. % of Graduate
Status of Parents Population Student Body Student Body
Bureaucrats 1.5 26.8 38.6
Intellectuals 2.9 33.8 31.6
Non-manual employees 4.1 11.8 12.3
Manual Workers 16.4 17.3 8.8
Farmers 75.0 10.2 8.8
Total 99.9 99.9 100.1
Source: Column 1: State Statistical Bureau PRC. 1988,
Statistical Yearbook of China 1987, Hong Kong: Longman.
Column 2: based on the author's survey.
million population in this county were workers and farmers
(Fei, 1978). The data in Table 4.3 are from a survey
conducted by the author, concerning the distribution of
college and graduate education among different social groups
(see Appendix). The table shows that the majority of
university students are from bureaucrats and intellectuals
families. While bureaucrats and intellectuals only account
for less than 5 percent of total employed population, their
children make up 60.6percent of total college students and
70.2 percent of total graduate students. Manual workers and
farmers account for 91.4 percent of total employed population,
their children only represent 27.5 percent of total
undergraduate students and 17.6 percent of total graduate
students.
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Other socialist countries
Data on education systems in other socialist countries
are very scarce. However, from the limited data available, we
can find the same kind of unequal distribution of education.
According to Flakierski (1986), for example, in 1970s, the top
10 percent of per capita income households in Hungary received
four times more university education than the bottom 10
percent. The children of the managerial and intellectual
group received eight times more university education than the
children of unskilled workers.
From the above analysis, we may conclude that in
socialist countries, education is not equally distributed.
First, because of the low wage and low living standard, for
many families in the low social strata, going to school is
still considered to be a burden, instead of a free
opportunity. Second, in terms of distribution of education,
there are serious disparities between rural and urban
population and between different occupations. We are not able
to make an accurate estimate of size distribution of
educational benefits from data available; however, we can be
sure to conclude that the distribution of education is not
more equal than the wage distribution.
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Chapter 5
Health Care
Perhaps the inequality in health services is the most
difficult item to estimate. There is virtually no statistical
data available on how the health fund is distributed among
population. However, many phenomenon in socialist medical
system suggest that there is a very serious unequal
distribution. First hand observations also confirm that the
disparities in the access to medical care among different
social groups are significant.
In the USSR, in theory there is a unified medical system
planned and managed by the Ministry of Health. In reality,
several subsystems provide medical care of differing quality
to a variety of population groups (Davis 1988). There are six
types of legal subsystems of medical care: elite,
departmental, capital city, industrial, provincial city, and
rural. This total medical structure corresponds to the
hierarchical social structure. Table 5.1 shows the number of
population each of the six subsystems serves. The elite
subsystem is specifically set up to serve the Soviet party and
government elites and their families. This subsystem has the
highest quality of medicines and equipments and is staffed by
the best medical personnel in the USSR. The departmental
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Table 5.1 Distribution of Soviet Population Among
Six Subsystems of Medical Care in 1975
Number of
Medical Population Percent
Subsystem (Millions) of Total
Elite 1.0 0.4%
Departmental 12.7 5.0
Capital city 49.1 19.4
Industrial 20.2 8.0
Provincial city 40.9 16.1
Rural district 129.4 51.1
Total 253.3 100.0
Source: Davis, Christopher M., 1988, "The Organization and
Performance of the Contemporary Soviet Health Service,"
in G. W. Lapidus & G. E. Swanson, State and Welfare
USA/USSR, pp. 95-142.
subsystem serves people affiliated with the controlling
organizations, such as the Ministry of Defence, the secrete
police (KGB), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and are closed
to the public. The level of medical care is higher than the
other four public subsystems because the economic and
political power of the controlling organizations ensure better
access to available resources. (Davis, 1988, p. 118).
According to Davis, most Soviet citizens receive their
medical care in one of the other four subsystems, among which
the capital city system is the best. The capital city system
are managed by the main administration of public health in
capital cities of the Soviet republics, where "institutions
are specialized, the quality of the staff is relatively high,
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modern equipment and medicines are available, and the urban
transportation network facilities home care and emergency aid"
(Davis, 1988, p. 119). The industrial subsystem and the
provincial city subsystem are not as good as the capital city
system. They are characterized by low level of specialized
hospitals, low quality of personnel, and resource constraints
are tighter. Nevertheless, compared to the rural health
subsystem, they are still high in quality. The rural health
subsystem is the worst, where the medical care "is still years
behind that in the cities" (Davis, 1988, p. 119). This
subsystem is marked by serious shortages of medical personnel,
basic medicines and equipments; poorly developed
transportation and public sanitation, and lack of supplemental
funding. over a half of total Soviet population receive their
medical services from this rural health subsystem.
In general, in 1975 about 25 percent of the Soviet
population had access to medical care of a relatively high
standard; another 24 percent obtained decent services in
industrial or provincial city subsystems; 51 percent have only
low-quality medical services. Moreover, as Davis found, even
within one same system, the accesses to medical care are not
equal.
We are not able to find more specific data on
inequalities in the distribution of medical care. From the
above analysis, however, we can at least be safe to conclude
that the access to medical services is very unequal among
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different social strata. Furthermore, it is also safe to
conclude that the data on medical distribution from Ofer and
Vinokur survey (Table 2.4 on page 16) are unlikely to be true.
China
In China, the medical system is very similar to the one
in the Soviet Union. The only major difference is that in
China rural farmers do not receive free medical services from
the State, they have to pay full medical expenses on their
10
own
The Chinese urban medical system is a very complex
hierarchical structure. As in other socialist countries,
there is a constant shortage of medical services, hospital
beds, and well-trained doctors in China. For ordinary urban
residents, from manual workers to university professors, going
to see doctor is always an unpleasant experience, if they do
not have any personal connection with doctors. The quality of
services is usually not very high, and long waits and
overcrowding are normal situation. Under such a circumstance,
anyone who has some power would try their best to avoid this
kind of frustration and make sure that he or she can receive
10The description of the Chinese medical system in this
paragraph and next one is based on the author's personal
knowledge.
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best medical care available as soon as it is needed.
Consequently, besides the closed medical system for the elites
at national level, in every public or departmental hospital
there is a section officially labeled "high-ranking cadres'
ward" (gaogang bingfang), which provides the best doctors and
equipments in the hospital for local cadres at different
levels, who are not privileged enough to have access to the
closed elite medical systems. This "high-ranking cadres'
ward" represents a subhierarchy at every level of the overall
hierarchical medical system. Moderate-ranking cadres in
provincial level receive services in provincial-city
hospitals' "high-ranking cadres' ward," low-ranking cadres in
local small cities or counties have access to "high-ranking
cadres wards" in city hospitals or county hospitals.
On the other hand, since the total medical fund is
limited, the rest of the mass without any official rank and
power would have to share whatever is leftover by those
bureaucrats. According to the author's personal experience,
for ordinary people there is a serious shortage for hospital
beds. Many people usually have to wait for months or even
years to obtain a bed and to have their long delayed
surgeries. Under such a hierarchical system, one can imagine
that the medical funds would be more unequally distributed
than wages and salaries.
A featured article in People's Daily (April 3, 1989, p.
7) reports that in a local city there were more than 3,200
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retired cadres who had access to "high-ranking cadres' ward"
in the city's hospitals. In 1986 they consumed on average
2,020 yuan medical expense from the state (the average urban
household per capita income was 828 yuan in 1986). The
article goes on to state that these retired cadres occupy the
wards for years without any illness, and do not allow any
other people even to use them temporarily. Some of them have
been there for 18 years. They go to wards mainly for
entertainment, to play "Majun" or to flirt with young nurses.
As the article points out: "For those staying at high-ranking
cadres' ward, two-tenths are for real illness, and eight-
tenths are for enjoyment--enjoying the symbol of high
positions and privileges. This 'high-ranking cadres' ward'
system divides patients into strictly different ranks."
The article does not mention what kind of medical
privileges were enjoyed by greater number of cadres in the
city who are not retired and are still in power. Neither does
it mention the more privileged elites, both retired or not, at
provincial or departmental levels, and at the national level.
However, the article points out that the reported situation in
that city can be seen everywhere in the country. When there
are so many privileged retired cadres at local city level, we
can well imagine the overall distribution of medical services
among different social strata.
In other socialist countries, because the social
structures are similar to those in the Soviet Union and China,
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there are similar inequalities in the distribution of medical
services. For example, in Hungary, studies show that
nonmanual workers' households use health services to a greater
extent than the manual workers' households and particularly
farmers' households (Adam & Nosal, 1982).
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Chapter 6
Pensions
In socialist countries, pensions is another large item of
social benefit. In the USSR, expenditures on pensions in 1981
was 35.4 billion rubles, which amounted to 29.0 percent of
total social consumption budget and 5.3 percent of GNP
(Madison, 1988). In China pensions amounted to 9.6 percent of
total wage bill in 1986 (SSBP, 1988). There are usually two
major types of pensions: sick leave and old-age pension. For
the majority of population in socialist countries, pensions
are the only economic resource for the old aged people.
In China, ordinary manual and nonmanual workers in the public
sector receive 40-70 percent of their wages, depending on
their seniority (LGWX,1973). For party, government, or
managerial cadres, there is a different retirement system,
which is called "Lixio." The amount of retirement pensions
ranges from 100-150 percent of their original salaries,
according to their ranks and seniority.
In case of sick leave, the pension is determined by
seniority. For a sick leave less than six months, a person
with more than eight years of seniority receives full pay;
otherwise he or she gets 60 percent of the original salary.
For sick leave extending beyond six months, the pension is
reduced to 40-60 percent of his or her pay, depending on the
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person's seniority (LGWX, 1973).
A sample survey conducted in 1982 in Beijing found that
the retirement pension was unequally distributed among
different social groups (see Table 6.1) (Lin and Geng, 1983).
On average high-level intellectuals received 3.8 times as much
as the retirement pension received by service workers, and 3.3
times as much as that by manual workers. The survey did not
include high level bureaucrats and managers, who usually enjoy
the privileged retirement system (Lixio) and receive high
pensions.
Now we may recall the Chinese official data on the
distribution of retired pension in the beginning of the thesis
(Table 2.6), which shows that the inequality in the
Table 6.1 The Distribution of Retirement Pensions by Social
Groups, Beijing, 1982
Occupations Average pension Percent Percent below
per month (yuan) of sample poverty level
High-level intellectual 157.8 4.5 --
Ordinary cadres 86.1 25.4 --
Non-manual staffs 63.0 10.7 --
Manual workers 48.1 50.5 5.2
Service workers 41.7 8.9 4.9
Total 100.0 10.1
Source: Based on a sample survey conducted in May 1982, see
Lin, Lenong, and Geng, Kung. 1983. "A Survey of Retired
Workers," Shehui Kexue Zhanxian, No.3, p. 105.
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distribution of retirement pensions is much worse than that of
wages. This is in accordance with our above analysis.
In the USSR, the amount of pension is also related to
pensioner's average past earnings; however, the Soviet pension
policy sets restrictions on maximum and minimum amounts of
pensions, which is intended to avoid extreme disparity. This
policy does have an equalizing effect within each social
group, but reinforces disparity between different social
strata. In 1979, for example, the maximum amount of pension
was 300 rubles per month for managerial and supervisory jobs,
and it was only 150 rubles for ordinary workers and employees
(Madison, 1988). Data in table 6.2 are derived from a sample
survey of 232 former Soviet pensioners who left their country
in late 1970s. We find from Table 6.2 a similar pattern of
Table 6.2 Influence of Prior Earnings on Pensions in the
USSR, late-1970
Prior Monthly Earnings, Rubles
Monthly Percent
Pension <70 70-100 101-150 151-200 >200 of Total
< 46 78% 28% -- 2% -- 8%
46-51 11 18 3% -- -- 5
-------- Poverty Line ------
52-70 11 54 45 -- 1 21
71-119 -- -- 50 84 12 34
120 -- -- 2 14 87 32
Total 4 17 24
Source: Madison, Bernice, 1988,
Social Security," in G. W.
and Welfare, USA/USSR, pp.
22 33 100
"The Soviet Pension System and
Lapidus & G. E. Swanson, State
180.
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disparities as in other socialist countries. Those who had
held high wage jobs also received high pensions after their
retirement, and the majority of those who held low-wage jobs
11lived below poverty line after their retirement
11Here again , we may compare Madison's survey data with
Ofer and Vinokur's survey data. Based on our knowledge of the
Soviet social and political structure, and particularly based
on the way Soviet pensions are distributed, we would judge that
Madison's data are much more close to the Soviet reality than
Ofer and Vinokur's data.
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Chapter 7
Price Subsidies and others
In this chapter, we discuss the distribution of price
subsidies and other items of social benefit (such as cultural
facilities). Here, price subsidies refer to the state
subsidies on food and other commodities. Subsidies on
housing-rent, which is covered in the housing section, are not
included.
Commodity price subsidies are considered to be a major
redistributive instrument by the socialist state. The purpose
of this policy is to keep the price low, so that low income
families are able to get basic goods and services.
Artificially low prices, however, tend to create excessive
demand and chronic shortage, which makes access to
distributive process, not money, the main determinant of
distribution of material consumption (Kornai, 1980).
Moreover, this low price policy creates a black market.
Whoever has power and access to the distributive process can
get more commodities, and therefore get more benefits from
price subsidy. Ordinary people have often to wait in long
lines and only get limited amount of goods. Many people at
the bottom of the society (for example, most farmers in China)
have to go to the black market and pay much higher prices to
obtain basic goods. Thus, they receive little benefit from
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price subsidies12
There are few detailed studies on the distribution of
price subsidies in socialist countries, but from scattered
data we can at least get a sense of the overall distributional
pattern. A study in Hungary, based on a sample of goods at
1973 prices, shows that the consumer price system is
dysfunctional from the social policy aspect: it only increases
the inequality among the social groups (Daniel, 1983). A
study by Juhasz, which is confined to food price subsidies,
also demonstrates that the food price system did not have a
redistributive effect at all--the benefit was distributed as
unequally as wages (Adam and Nosal, 1982).
Table 7.1 shows households' expenditure on subsidized
commodities and noncommodity items among different income
household groups in China in 1986. If we assume that the
distribution of price subsidies depends on the amount of goods
purchased, and we further assume that the amount of goods
purchased is in proportion to the amount of money spent on
them, then we can measure the inequalities in the distribution
of price subsidies according to the different amounts of money
spent on subsidized goods by different income groups. The
Based on the author's knowledge, in China, a package of
cigarettes in the black market sell at three or four times the
official price; rice, more than twice the official price;
colored TV set, more than twice. The fact that there are massive
black market activities for basic goods indicates that large
number of ordinary people, who have little access to the
official subsidized market, have to get goods from the black
market. See Grossman (1977) and Katsenelinboigen (1977).
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Table 7.1 Urban Household Expenditure on Commodities and
Other Subsidized Items, China 1986
Deciles of Households (yuan) Ratio between
Top/bottom
1 2 9 10 Deciles
A. Expenditure on
commodities 431.8 527.6 911.0 1169.3 2.7
of which,
1. Food 275.5 323.6 482.3 572.2 2.1
2. Clothing 58.7 75.4 141.2 166.3 2.8
3. Articles for
cultural life
& activities 15.7 25.4 79.6 118.6 7.5
4. Medicine and
Medical goods 6.1 7.8 8.4 11.2 1.8
5. Fuel 11.3 11.8 14.4 16.9 1.5
B. Non-commodity
expenditure 38.0 46.3 76.4 93.8 2.5
of which,
6. Water and
electricity 6.1 7.1 9.8 11.9 2.0
7. Transportation 3.4 4.6 10.1 13.2 3.9
8. School fees 8.6 9.4 8.4 8.5 1.0
9. Cultural life
& recreation 1.2 1.7 3.1 3.8 3.2
Source: State Statistical Bureau PRC. 1988, Statistical
Yearbook of China 1987, Hong Kong: Longman.
data in Table 7.1 show that the most serious disparities are
in the consumption of cultural and recreational articles and
activities, and transportation. Their ratios between top and
bottom deciles are 7.5:1 and 3.9:1 respectively, which are
higher than the disparity in wages (3.35). This finding shows
the different life styles of people in different social
groups. People in higher social strata tend to use cultural
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facilities to a greater extent than manual workers.
According to data in Table 7.1, the distribution of food
subsidies, which is the largest share of total subsidies, is
less unequal than that of wages; however, if we take into
account the existence of the black market (i.e. ordinary
people have to pay high prices for the same goods), the
disparities in real consumption of food would be much greater.
Table 7.2 compares the income disparity to the
disparities in using of cultural facilities in Hungary.
Apparently, there is a remarkably high correlation between
distribution of income and that of cultural subsidies. In
Table 7.2 Social Position, Per Capita Income, and
Cultural Indexes, Hungary 1960s.
Index of
Per capita cultural
Social strata by income indexa levelb
occupation of head (average (average
of household = 100) = 100)
(A) (B)
Higher professionals 151 193
Average-level experts 125 153
Office clerks 117 147
Skilled workers 107 110
Trained workers 93 87
Unskilled workers 81 67
Agricultural manual workers 86 60
Correlation coefficient: columns A/B 0.98
Source: Lane, David, 1982, The End of Social Inequality?
London: Allen & Unwin.
a. Based on size, conveniences, and equipment of houses.
b. Cultural level combines average level of education of
family, books, newspapers, radio, and TV.
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another study, Flakierski (1986) also noted that in Hungary in
1977, the top 10 percent of households received three and a
half times more cultural facilities than the lowest 10
percent.
Here we are not arguing for an egalitarian distribution.
What we demonstrate here is that the distribution of price
subsidies do not help the poor very much, it is not more
equally distributed than wages. If the socialist governments
really want to make the material distribution more equal, they
should stop subsidizing goods and services, and cultural
facilities. They should let the rich people pay full costs of
the goods and services, and adopt social welfare programs,
such as food stamps, that exclusively target the poor.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
We have examined the distribution of major items of
social consumption in socialist countries. Now, we can come
back to the question posed at the beginning of this thesis: is
the social consumption more equally distributed than wages?
All evidence shows that compared to wages, the
distribution of social consumption tends to be more unequal.
In socialist countries, the extent of inequalities in wage
distribution is limited, because the distribution of wages is
controlled by the central government through a rigid and
complicated wage system, and every person in the urban sector
of socialist countries is guaranteed a job and receives at
least an above-minimum wage. The distribution of social
consumption, however, is much more flexible, and therefore is
easier to be manipulated by those who have power and position.
In socialist countries, everybody is entitled but not
guaranteed to have a share of social consumption. Under the
situation of shortages, everybody has to compete with each
other in the administrative allocational process for obtaining
free goods and services. Conceivably, under such a
circumstance, people with political and distributional power
tend to get whatever they want, and people at the bottom of
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society are likely to be excluded from the distributional
process. This explains why many scholars in socialist
countries, such as Szelenyi (1983) and Zhao (1985), claim that
an introduction of market mechanisms into the socialist system
will help the poor to obtain access to distributional process,
as well as to restrain the use of political power in material
distribution.
Turning to the controversial issue at the beginning of
the thesis, why the studies conducted by Western scholars tend
to indicate a very equal distribution of social consumption in
socialist countries? The main reason is that those studies
are usually based on the official statistical data from
socialist countries. As Michael (1975) points out, the
official statistical data from socialist countries usually
fail to document the inequalities in the distribution of
public goods and services. Here we are not claiming that the
officials in socialist countries intend to lie. There is
simply no way to record everyone's consumption of free goods
and services, such as the consumptions of health services,
housing, education, and cultural facilities. The quality and
cost of these free goods and services differ a great deal.
The statistical data usually measure free goods and services
in quantitative terms, such as the number of visits to
hospital, the number of rooms of housing, and the number of
school seats. These quantitative measures fail to record the
differences in qualities of these goods and services. For
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individual students in China, for example, the value of a seat
in a "key school" is very different from that in an ordinary
school. The differences are not only in the different amount
of educational funds received, but more importantly, it
determines the whole future of a student. Similarly, the
value of a "high-cadres' ward" with its expensive medicine and
high quality doctors is very different from the value of a
hospital bed in a town hospital.
Both the Hungarian and Chinese data in Tables 2.5 and 2.6
have the kind of problems mentioned above. Both of them are
not very accurate. However, the Chinese data were obtained
through a household sample survey, relating quantitative
measure to individual households with certain level of
accuracy, the Hungarian data are not based on such a survey.
This may be the reason that the Chinese data reveal a more
unequal distribution of social consumption than the Hungarian
data.
In fact, it is almost impossible to obtain accurate data
on the distribution of social consumption in the socialist
countries. First, it would be a too complicated task to
measure every quantitative and qualitative differences of the
consumption of free goods and services in monetary term.
Second, even if such an endeavor were technically possible,
the socialist government would find it politically undesirable
to do it, because it will only cause political conflicts and
tensions in the society if people know the exact inequalities
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in social consumption among different social groups.
As may be noted by readers, throughout the analysis of
distribution of social consumption, we constantly encounter
the issue of political power and accesses to the
distributional process. It is always true that in socialist
countries, whoever has power and position will also receive
better material rewards than ordinary people. This phenomenon
makes us realize that to understand the inequalities in
socialist countries, first of all we need to study the
distribution of political power, instead of pure income
distributional data. I will conduct this interesting study
in another paper.
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Appendix
Sample Survey on the Distribution of
Chinese Higher Education
The author selected 13 Chinese students in Boston area,
who attended universities in China from 1977 to 1987. They
were asked to recall and to classify their former classmates
into different groups according to thier parents' occupations.
These students represent 13 classes in six majors from 8
universities which are located in six cities all over China
(see Table A-1 and A-2). This survey may be a little biased
to overestimate the children of intellectuals and bureaucrats,
and to underestimate farmers children, because seven of the
eight universities and colleges are first class institutes in
China, while farmers' children tend to concentrate in local
level agricultural, forestry, and teacher's colleges. The
author believe, however, the survey reveal the overall
structure of Chinese university student body.
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Table A-2 PARENTS' OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF CHINESE GRADURTE SCHOOL STUDENTS IN DIFFERENT UNIVERSITIES
1982-67
BureaucraLs Ordinary Manual
University Location M1ajor B. Managers Intellectuals Staff Workers Farmers
Tsinghua University Beijing Economics 53.3% 26.7% .0% 6.? 13.3%
Architecture 41.2 29.4 17.6 5.9 5.9
Fudang University Shanghai Economics 22.4 20.4 24.5 18.4 14.3
Nanjing University Nanjing Geography 11.1 44.4 22.2 11.1 11.1
Hankai University Tianjin Hathematics 40.0 30.0 0.0 10.0 20.0
Total 36.6 31.6 12.3 8.8 8.8
Table A-1 PARENTS' OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF UNDERGR AGUATE STUDENTS IN CHINESE UNIVERSITIES, 1977-87
Bureaucrats Ordinary Manual
University Location Major & Managers Intellectuals Staff Workers Farmers
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tsinghua University
Tongji University
Fudang University
Shanghai Chemical
Engineering College
Nanjing University
Zhongshan University
Harbin Architecture
and Civil Engineering
Institute
Beijing Economics
Architecture
Shanghai Urban planning
Architecture
Shanghai Economics
Chemical
Shanghai Engineering
Nanj ing Geography
Guangzhou Geograghy
Harbin Architecture
26.8 33.8
23.3%
30.8
40.0
17.2
22.4
45.8
12.9
33.3
20.0
40.0%
47.7
20.0
44.8
20.4
20.8
22.6
30.0
46.7
13.3%
3.1
4.0
3.4
14.3
4.2
32.3
16.7
16.7%
13.8
16.0
31.0
16.4
29.2
12.9
3.3
0.0
4.6
20.0
3.4
24.5
0.0
19.4
16.7
30.0
11.8
'0
3.3
17.3 '. 10.2Total
References
Adam, Jan, and Nosal, Milosav, 1982, "Earnings Differentials
and Household Income Differentials in Hungary," Journal of
Comparative Economics, No. 6, pp. 173-203.
Bergson, Abram, 1984. "Income Inequality Under Soviet
Socialism," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 22,
pp. 1052-1099.
Chen, Hong, 1988, "'Guangbenwei' Chutan," People's Daily
(Overseas edition), August 3, p. 2.
Chilosi, Alberto, 1980, "Income Distribution Under Soviet-type
Socialism: An Interpretative Framework," Journal of
Comparative Economics, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-18.
Chu, Cheng-Ping, 1978, "The National Economic Balance Table,"
in Chinese Economic Planning (Translation), Edited by
Lardy, Nicholas R., White Plains, New York: M. E. Sharpe
Inc., pp. 115-130.
Conner, Walter D. 1979. Socialism, Politics and Equality, New
York: Columbia University Press.
Daniel, Z., 1983, "Public Housing, Personal Income and Central
Redistribution in Hungary," Acta Oeconomica, Vol. 31 (1-2),
pp. 87-104.
1985, "The effect of housing allocation on social
inequality in Hungary," Journal of Comparative Economics,
No.9, 391-409.
Davis, Christopher M., 1988, "The organization and Performance
of the Contemporary Soviet Health Service," in G. W.
Lapidus & G. E. Swanson, op. cit., pp. 95-142.
DiMaio, Alfred J., Jr., 1974, Soviet Urban Housing, New York,
Praeger.
Dobson, Richard B., 1988, "High Education in the Soviet Union:
Problems of Access, Equality, and Public Policy," in G. W.
Lapidus & G. E. Swanson, op. cit., pp. 17-59.
Fei, Hei. 1978. "Is the new university-recruiting system
promoting the three differences?" Zheiiang Ribao, July 13.
68
Flakierski, Henryk, 1986, Economic Reform and Income
distribution: A Case Study of Hungary and Poland, Armonk,
New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
Grossman, Gregory, 1977, "The Second Economy of the USSR,"
Problems of Communism, No. 26, pp. 25-39.
, 1988. "A Tonsorial View of the Soviet Second
Economy," in P. Wiles, ed, The Soviet Economy on the Brink
of Reform, Boston: Unwin Hyman. pp. 165-192.
He, Xiaopei, 1982, "Several surveys on present income rewards
for manual labor and non-manual labor," Jingji Yaniiu,
No.8, pp. 33-50.
Hu, Fengje, 1984, "On the Aspects of Distribution Not Related
to Work and Policy Implication," Jingli Yaniiu (in
Chinese), No. 10, pp. 44-47.
Ji, Jun, 1985, "On the structure of college student body,"
Dongbei Shida Xiebao, No.3.
Katsenelinboigen, A., 1977, "Colored Markets in the Soviet
Union," Soviet Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1. pp. 62-85.
Lane, David, 1982, The End of Social Inequality? London: Allen
and Unwin.
Lapidus, Gail W., and Swanson, G. E., 1988, State and Welfare,
USA/USSR, Berkeley, California: Institute of International
Studies.
Lavigne, Marie, 1974, The Socialist Economics of the Soviet
Union and Europe, First U.S. edition, White Plain:
International Arts and Science Press, Inc.
LGWX, 1973. Laodong Gongzi Wenxian Xuangbian, Fuzhou, China:
Fujian Provincial Revolutionary Committee.
Lin, Lenong, and Geng, Kung. 1983. "A Survey of Retired
Workers," Shehui Kexue Zhanxian, No.3, pp. 101-108.
Liu, Jianjun, 1989, "China is promoting privatization of
housing," People's Daily (Overseas edition), January 2.
Madison, Bernice, 1988, "The Soviet Pension System and Social
Security," in G. W. Lapidus & G. E. Swanson, op. cit.
pp. 163-212.
Matthews, Mervyn, 1978, Privilege in the Soviet Union,
London: Allen and Unwin.
69
, 1982, Education in the Soviet Union, London: Allen
and Unwin.
McAuley, Alastair, 1979, Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union,
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
, 1982, "Sources of Earnings Inequality: A Comment on
A. Nove's Income Distribution in the USSR," Soviet Studies,
Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 443-447.
Michael, Jan M., 1975, "An Alternative Approach to Measuring
Income Inequality in Eastern Europe," in Economic
Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Vol. 1,
Reforms, Technology, and Income Distribution, New York,
Praeger, pp. 256-275.
Morrison, Christian, 1984, "Income Distribution in East
European and Western Countries," Journal of Comparative
Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 121-138.
Ofer, Gur, and Aaron Vinokur, 1988, "The Distributive Effects
of the Social Consumption Fund in the Soviet Union," in G.
Lapidus and Guy E. Swanson op.cit., pp. 251-277.
Parish, W. 1981. "Egalitarianism in Chinese society," Problem
of Communism, Vol. 29, No. 11, pp. 37-53.
SAUS, 1987. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1988.
Sherer, John L., 1987, USSR Facts and Figures Annual, Vol.
11, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.
Sorokin, G. 1967, Planning in the USSR: Problem of Theory and
Organization, Moscow: Progress Publishers.
SSBP. 1984, State Statistical Bureau PRC. Almanac of China's
Economy, Beijing: China Statistical Information and
Consultancy Service Center.
, 1986: State Statistical Bureau PRC. A Survey of Income
and Expenditure of Urban Households in China, 1985,
Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy
Service Center.
, 1988. State Statistical Bureau PRC. Statistical Yearbook
of China 1987, Hong Kong: Longman.
Suranyi-Unger, Theo, 1972, Economic Philosophy of the
Twentieth Century, Dekalb: Northern Illinois University
Press.
70
Szelenyi, Ivan. 1983, Urban Inequalities Under State
Socialism, New York: Oxford University Press.
Treml, Vladimir G. 1978, Agriculture Subsidies in the Soviet
Union, Foreign Economic Report No. 15, U.S. Department of
Commerce.
Trescott, Paul B., 1985, "Incentives Versus Equality: What
Does China's Recent Experience Show?" World Development,
Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 205-217.
Vinokur, Aaron, and Ofer, Gur. 1987. "Inequality of earnings,
household income, and wealth in the Society Union in the
1970s," in Millar, J. R., Politics, work, and daily life in
the USSR, Cambridge University Press.
Wiles, Peter, 1974, Distribution of Income: East and West,
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Wu, Jingbiao, 1984. "Survey report: On the cause of school
-repeaters," (in Chinese) Zhongxue Jiaoyu, No.5, pp. 39-43.
Xue, Muqiao, 1982 ed., Almanac of China's Economy 1981, Hong
Kong: Modern Culture Company Limited.
Yang, Shengming, 1985, "Explore Consumption Reform in Our
Country," (in Chinese). Jingji Yaniiu, No. 3, pp. 20-23.
Yanowich, Murray, and Fisher, Welsley A. (ed), 1973, Social
Stratification and Mobility in the USSR, White Plains, NY:
International Arts and Sciences Press.
, 1977, Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet
Union, White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Zhang, Chenxian, 1982, "On the Educational Reforms," Renmin
Jaoyu, 1982. No. 1, pp. 13-15.
Zhao, Renwei, 1985, "Several Trends of Workers' Personal
Income Distribution," (in Chinese). Jingii Yaniiu, No. 3,
pp. 10-19.
Zhu, Jienghong, and Wang, Guozen, 1988, Housing-Housing, (in
Chinese) Shengyang: Liaoning People's Publishing House.
Zhuan, Qidong, and Li, Jianli. 1985. "On Workers' retirement-
insurance system," (in Chinese) Renmin Ribao, Sept. 6,
p. 5.
71
